Abstract-Recently, the Android platform has seen its number of malicious applications increased sharply. Motivated by the easy application submission process and the number of alternative market places for distributing Android applications, rogue authors are developing constantly new malicious programs. While current anti-virus software mainly relies on signature detection, the issue of alternative malware detection has to be addressed. In this paper, we present a feature based detection mechanism relying on opcode-sequences combined with machine learning techniques. We assess our tool on both a reference dataset known as Genome Project as well as on a wider sample of 40,000 applications retrieved from the Google Play Store.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last year, Android became the most used mobile Operating System around the world with more than one billion devices already activated and over one million activations every single day [1] . This context makes Android attractive for users, developers and also the attackers who can develop and distribute malware easily. While anti-virus vendors do not agree on the market shares of malware owned by the Android OS, they acknowledge that this is the favourite target of rogue authors to spread mobile malware [2] , [3] . Google reacted in setting up Google Bouncer, which scans applications before submission. However, according to a Kaspersky security bulletin [2] , no significant change has been observed. Researchers [4] have found ways to bypass the Google Bouncer in fingerprinting the Android emulator used by the service. In order to thwart those threats, anti-viruses vendors adapted their detection mechanisms to Android applications. Since it uses signature based detection, this approach is designed to catch only known threats [5] . Android malware detection is not easy to achieve and is an active area of research. Dynamic approaches must consider the several entry points from which applications can be started, whereas static approaches must deal with known obfuscation techniques [6] . In this paper, we propose a static approach combining opcode-sequences and machine learning techniques. To the best of our knowledge no previous approach tackled Android malware detection using this technique. We sum up here the contributions of this paper:
• We present an approach based on opcode-sequences that we assessed on a reference Android malware dataset available for the research community;
• We propose a realistic assessment on a snapshot of the Google Play Store -retrieved in the first six months of 2012 -in order to test the validity in a real life scenario. ;
• We compare our approach with several well-known anti-virus products;
• We give access to a dataset of applications that our tool detected as malicious while anti-virus packages did not.
In the section II we present our approach and continue then with the results on a reference dataset in section III. We review the related works in section IV and conclude the paper in the section V.
II. APPROACH

A. Feature Extraction
Many feature sets have already been used in the past to detect malicious programs: n-grams [7] , opcodes [8] , Android permissions combined with Control Flow Graphs [9] and several others. Finding the feature set that generalizes the most our observable is the most challenging task. Opcodesequences that we will refer as k-grams, have already proven their efficiency to classify Windows binaries [10] , [11] , [12] . However, we opted for a slightly different approach based on opcode-sequence occurrence, introduced further. To make our tool more resilient to obfuscation, we are using opcodes without operands. The reason is that operands can be easily changed without altering the semantics of the source-code. Opcodes are extracted from the classes.dex file and must be translated into opcode-sequences. Figure 1 depicts how a method is translated into opcode-sequences of length three.
B. Overall Architecture
The classification mechanism is split into two parts, the first aims at building the model according to the machine learning algorithm and the second uses this model as input to classify unknown applications. Since our approach relies on supervised learning, we need only labelled instances to build a model. To build a tool able to classify Android applications we process as follows:
• Collect all the possible k-grams in all the set of applications as an initial feature set • Apply a selection algorithm in order to determine the most relevant features;
• Create a model using these relevant feature set
• Use this model to classify unknown applications.
Instead of using the weighted frequency of opcodesequences, as used in [10] , [11] , [12] , we collect binary occurrences of k-grams. In using binary count, we characterize the minimal functionalities required by a program to function properly. On the contrary, if extracting weighted opcodesequence frequencies, the whole structure of a program is represented. The advantage of using binary count is that the total number of opcode-sequences is not required.
C. Classification Mechanism
Machine-learning-based detection has already been used for detecting malicious Android programs [13] , [9] ; nevertheless, as far as we know, none of these approaches was assessed on a wide dataset as ours. In order to find the best suited algorithm, we tested some well-known implementation of machine learning algorithms such as libsvm [14] or C 5.0 [15] . As a consequence, we opted for a linear implementation of SVM -Support Vector Machine -classification known as liblinear. According to [16] , this implementation is adapted to process both a large amount of instances and features.
We used a smart feature selection so that only significant features remain to build the model. The initial number of features depends on the k parameter that we choose for opcode-sequences. We could evaluate the number of possible k-grams to M th = N k where N = 224 is the number of permitted opcodes. However, in a real scenario this number varies due to opcode semantics. Hence, for k = 5 we could expect to count about 564 billions different k-grams but we observed M obs = 5, 998, 223 on a set of 40,000 applications. We used a well-known feature selection based on the information gain computed for each feature. It aims at computing the information brought by each feature compared to the information brought by the labels. The formal definition of the information gain for a feature f ∈ F , where F is the set of all features, is :
where Ex represents the set of all instances to study, val(x, f ) is the value of the attribute f ∈ F of the instance x and H is the Shannon's entropy function.
Once computed for each feature, we can rank opcodesequences according to their information gain. This ranking is used afterwards to reduce our feature set in keeping only the most significant features and thereby reduce the information loss.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We run our experiments on the Genome Project's dataset introduced in [17] . We choose to use this dataset as a ground truth since it contains only malicious programs that were checked manually by analysts. We are making our work comparable with other approaches since the dataset is openly available.
A. Experiments Description
As no goodware dataset has been published, we are running our experiments on ten different subsets of 1,246 Android applications randomly picked from the Android market. We use ten different datasets in order to work with balanced datasets and thus avoid overfitting problems. We define a goodware dataset as being a collection of applications that does not contain any instance of malicious applications present in the malicious set. We define the metrics that need to be computed to evaluate classification performances. The true positives rate T P rate and true negatives rates T N rate are defined as T P rate = T P T P +F N and respectively T N rate = T N T N+F P . These metrics represent percentages of well classified instances over each class -malign and benign in our case . Assuming that positive stands for malign applications and negative for benign instances, the recall is defined as Recall malign = T P rate and Recall benign = T N rate . Another interesting measure is the precision where P recision malign = T P T P +F P and P recision benign = T N T N+F N . Precision measures the likelihood of good prediction while recall measures probability of good retrieving. Finally, F-measure is defined as F-measure c = 2·P recisionc·Recallc P recisionc+Recallc , where c denotes the class considered. We choose the average F-measure to evaluate tool performances since it takes into account both Recall and Precision while classification accuracy only considers the Recall values of both classes.
In order to find the best value for k, we run ten-fold cross-validation experiments on each combination of malware/goodware datasets. In addition, we limited the number of features to the 200,000 highest information-gain features. We needed to do this for performance reasons since for k = 5 we extracted N = 1, 305, 511 different features for only one malware/goodware combination. Figure 2 shows the results for different combinations of malware/goodware datasets. These distributions have been plotted considering the average Fmeasure over classes for each fold of each run. We can see that the best results are obtained for k = 5. Another good property for 5 − grams is the squeezed shape of the distribution. This means that the results are more steady among the several runs. The choice of the benign dataset has a small impact on classification results. Indeed, we observed a low standard deviation of the average F-measure computed per dataset. The standard deviation among ten datasets is F-measure stdev = 0.0027 for k = 5. This means that our work can be easily compared with other approaches using the Genome Project's dataset. Figure 3 depicts the F-measure obtained over the different classes as well as the average when the number of features varies. This was sketched from the results of several ten fold cross-validation evaluations. Good classification results with only few features can be achieved. Indeed with 2,000 features, we are able to get good classification performances since F-Measure > 0.95. We also observe that classification results become steady around 70,000 features. This number of features is sound since F-Measure 70,000 = 0.9759, which is the closer value to F-Measure target = 0.9771. Figure I shows the ten most significant opcode-sequences. Some sequences are specific to a certain class of applications, where opcodesequences two,six,nine and ten are seen only in malware.
B. Dataset Introduction
In order to assess the relevancy of our approach in a realistic scenario, we trained the detection tool on a labelled dataset obtained from VirusTotal [18] . We evaluate the model on a training set made of a snapshot of the Android Market retrieved during the first six months of 2012. We further compare our results with the results given by some anti-virus software available in the VirusTotal engine.
We gathered two datasets from VirusTotal, one containing 25,476 malware and another holding 15,670 benign applications. We also got access to 42,062 Android applications downloaded from the official Google Play Store market. To reduce noise in the training set we choose to use only files that raised at least three alarms out of 46. To avoid malware in the benign dataset, we removed all applications signed by a digital certificate used for signing malicious applications. We started the filtering process from respectively 15,670 benign and 22,476 malign instances. After filtering, 12,905 instances from the benign class and 11,960 malign applications remained. To avoid balancing issues between the two datasets, we opted for a down-sampling strategy regarding the benign class. Table II summarizes both the training and testing datasets. Table III shows the results obtained after having scanned the Google Play Store sample. The precision malicious means that an unknown application flagged as malicious by this tool have 96.83% of likelihood of being detected as such by at least We observe that in spite of the same knowledge basis as VirusTotal, our tool has different results. This aspect can be seen as an asset since we need diversity in order to detect new malware. We find interesting to compare our approach against several anti-virus packages used in VirusTotal. Figure 4 shows a comparison, in terms of number of detections, between our approach and the top 25 anti-virus packages available in VirusTotal. We define the top 25 anti-virus packages as being the 25 software that detected the most of malicious applications among our testing set. We explain hereafter how to read the chart for the detection software ESET-NOD32 1 .
C. Results
• Left to right stripes (yellow): our tool detected 918 applications that ESET-NOD32 did not;
• Right to left stripes (orange): 4296 applications were detected by both tools;
• No stripes (red): 554 were detected only by ESET-NOD32;
• Crossed stripes (green): 677 were not detected by both tool, but at least once by another anti-virus software.
We notice that our detection approach performs better than anti-virus packages available in VirusTotal taken individually. This chart also shows that only few malware detection software are suited to detect malicious Android applications. We relied on digital certificates to gather some hints about misclassified applications. When building a classification mechanism we must deal with false positives and false negatives. As we observe in Table III , we have 2,143 misclassified instances when compared with VirusTotal. To get the exact classification results, one should analyse each of them. However, completely reverse engineering Android applications for analysis is a long and tedious process. This is the reason why we used a lightweight method to reduce this amount of applications to analyse and thus avoid reverse engineering. Throughout a preliminary analysis of the datasets, we noticed interesting signature patterns for applications. As depicts Figure 5 , certificates signing malware, tend to sign more applications than other certificates do. In this histogram, we plot on the x axis the number of applications signed by a given certificate and on the y axis the frequency of such a signature pattern over the datasets. We rely on a method to quickly identify potentially malicious sets of applications. We extracted certificates from all applications presented in Table  II . Concerning false negatives, we see on Figure 5 that the signing pattern is closer to the pattern observed for malware. In analysing the reports given by VirusTotal concerning those applications we noticed that many of them were adware. Only 90 of these applications are not adware and thus can be considered as real threats. However, this set of applications does not worth analysing since applications in it have already been flagged as malicious by analysts. However, we can hope finding new malware in the false positive set. We searched for applications that were signed by certificates that already signed a malign application. We found that among these 952 apps, 194 were signed by a certificate that had already signed at least one application detected by VirusTotal. Thus, we can isolate this set of applications for a future analysis. In addition, we estimated the average number of applications signed by a given certificate in Table IV . In this table μ estimates the average number of applications signed by certificate, for each population. These estimations confirm that we can consider the signature pattern as being different between malign and benign applications. Knowing this, we propose a method to find applications with a high likelihood of maliciousness. We isolate suspicious certificate according to a threshold T = f (μ, σ) characterizing the number of applications signed. Once suspicious certificates are identified, we can find the applications signed and isolate them. As a result in taking the upper bound of the estimated mean μ with a confidence interval of 99%; we can isolate 128 applications in considering certificates that signed more than 11 applications. This value is obtained in setting the threshold to T = μ + 3σ for the benign population. Considering a normal distribution, over T = μ + 3σ only 0.135% of the population is represented. Hence, in selecting only certificates over this threshold, we isolate only outliers. In using this method, combined with the malicious certificate check, we can divide the set of applications to analyse by three since we isolated 322 applications over 952. Another advantage of this method is that we increase the likelihood of finding malware inside this subset. In studying signature pattern we also observe malicious behaviour that may explain why these applications were detected as malicious by our classification approach.
IV. RELATED WORK
In [19] the authors present JuxtApp, an Hadoop-based approach that extracts k-grams from basic blocks in order to detect similarities between two applications. DroidMoss [20] is another approach dealing with the similarity detection issue in using opcode. Firstly, all opcodes are extracted from applications and then a piecewise hashing is computed to compare applications. In [21] the authors present a dataset of 46 malware ranging from malware, personal spyware and grayware. They also present the current incentives of rogue authors as well as future motivations. The dataset of malware that we use in this paper has been introduced in [22] , this collection gathers 1,260 malicious programs ordered in 49 families. Andromaly, a machine learning-based detection technique, is introduced in [23] . The tool monitors memory use, calls, SMS as well as many other dynamic features. In [24] RiskRanker is presented, this approach aims at detecting applications having suspicious. This is performed through Control Flow Graph analysis as well as in looking for suspicious API use. Another static detection mechanism is presented in [17] where the authors present DroidRanger. This tool uses heuristics extraction and dynamic execution monitoring in order to detect unknown threats. In addition, the approach leverage a signature based detection to identify known threats. A dynamic approach is presented in [25] where the authors proposed a syscall monitoring approach further used to identify malicious signatures. Batyuk et al. introduce in [26] a solution aiming at disassembling code and looking at malicious API use. DroidMat [13] extracts information about Intent, API calls and permissions in order to classify applications in using clustering techniques. In [9] , the authors use Permissions and Control Flow Graph in order to detect malicious pattern user the One Class SVM algorithm. Two remote analysis approaches are introduced in [27] and [28] . Crowdroid [27] , the former approach, firstly collects syscalls on the phone and then it uses these feature on a remote server to detect anomaly. Walldroid [28] is an application based firewall aiming at detecting and blocking communications between smartphones and malicious servers.
In [29] , Grace et al. observed strange behaviours in several in-app advertisement libraries. Some of them are loading code dynamically, using code obfuscation in using the Java Reflection API, reading SMSs, accessing contacts or even starting GPS. Addressing the same topic, [30] shows that 56% of applications with ads access location through the ad library and that 23% of applications are using less privileges than the advertisement library it embeds.
V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
We have presented in this paper an efficient approach to classify Android applications and thus to detect Android malware. Our approach has the same limits that any supervised machine learning approach. It will not detect completely different malware. The evasion that could completely fool our approach is advanced bytecode-level obfuscation -for instance, in transforming the bytecode into a semantically equivalent program -since it would alter directly opcode-sequences. There are several commercial solutions capable of obfuscating Android applications. While our approach is not sensible to the Proguard obfuscation process since only method names and class names are modified it could be impacted by advanced obfuscation techniques, as reviewed in [31] . In a future work we intend to evaluate our approach against obfuscation in using ADAM [32] . We provide an open access to the matrices of features used for the experiments 2 presented in this paper. In addition, we can give access to our dataset of applications identified as malicious in this paper and not detected as such by anti-virus software.
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